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ERROR AND RATIONALITY IN
INDIVIDUAL DECISIONMAKING:
AN ESSAY ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF CHOICES
ROBERT

E. ScoTr*

How do individuals make choices? In recent years, economists, psychologists and legal academics have searched for answers to various aspects of this question. One topic of recent interest, for example, concerns
a lingering problem in information theory: Does consumer inability to
process "too much" information cause market failure?1 The normative
implications of this question raise significant policy issues. If consumers'
cognitive circuits can become overloaded, then information disclosure is
less appealing than direct regulation as a solution to problems of market
failure.
In their recent paper, The Irrelevance of Information Overload,2
Professors Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde have made an important con-

tribution to this debate. Their analysis exposes the theoretical defects in
the claim that overdisclosure is dysfunctional. The authors propose an
* Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1965 Oberlin College;
J.D. 1968, College of William and Mary; L.L.M. 1969, S.J.D. 1973, University of Michigan. I
would like to thank Ken Abraham, Clay Gillette, Tom Jackson, Saul Levmore, Henry Manne, John
Monahan, Alan Schwartz, and Paul Stephan for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this
Article. I am especially indebted to Joseph B. Kennedy (J.D. 1986) for his invaluable research
assistance in the preparation of this Article. In addition to contributing basic insights to the argument, Mr. Kennedy is principally responsible for the discussion of promise-making as a self-command strategy in Section III (C).
1. See, eg., Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. CONSUMER
RESEARCH 419 (1982); Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigmin Consumer
Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 436, 437 (1984).
2. Grether, Schwartz & Wilde, The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Information Overload].
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alternative model in which consumers ignore excess information by satisficing and provide some experimental confirmation of the model. By undermining the theoretical and empirical foundations of the information
overload hypothesis, Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde offer a strong defense
of disclosure as a valuable tool for correcting the market failures caused
by imperfect information. But given the tentative state of the research,
they invite further analysis of the literature on information processing
and cognitive error. Should this analysis expose difficulties with disclosure solutions, they imply that alternative methods of market intervention may be preferred.

Given the basic assumptions of information theory, 3 Grether,
Schwartz, and Wilde's analysis is internally consistent, and their normative assertions wholly plausible. This essay, therefore, is more of an aside

than a critical review. My concern is not with the authors' principal
argument, but with their uncritical assumption that the psychological

literature on human error or "cognitive illusion" is relevant to legal policy. My thesis can be stated simply: The vast literature on human error

and cognitive illusion has been and most likely will continue to be misunderstood by legal analysts.' The "error" in human judgment and decisionmaking that the psychological literature posits is the deviation
between empirically observed behavior and some theoretical conception
of ideal rationality.'

What this research exposes is a deviation between

3. Information theory purports to predict how consumers acquire and use information about
product attributes in selecting among goods with different attributes. The equilibrium search literature began with Rothschild's seminal discussion of market models under imperfect information. See
Rothschild, Models ofMarket Organizationwith Imperfect Information: A Survey, 81 J. POL. ECON.
1283 (1973). The early equilibrium search models made several strong assumptions: (1) firms maximize profits, but use only passive strategies of selling and altering prices based on consumer demand;
(2) firms sell a homogenous good with identical attributes observable before purchase; (3) consumers
act to minimize the net expected cost of purchase; and (4) consumers become informed only by
visiting firms, using a sequential search strategy. In subsequent work, many of these strong assumptions have been relaxed. See, eg., Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Marketsfor Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warrantiesand Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387 (1983) (relaxing
the assumption that all consumers have the same limit price) [hereinafter cited as Imperfect Information]; Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Marketson the Basis ofImperfect Information: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979) (relaxing the assumptions that consumers search
sequentially and that consumers are ignorant of the price distribution before searching).
4. See, eg., Davis, ProtectingConsumersfrom Overdisclosure and Gobbledygook, An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REv. 841, 847-50 (1977);
Davis, Revamping Consumer-CreditContractLaw, 68 VA. L. REv. 1333 (1982); Rakoff, Contractsof
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1983).
5. Conceptions of ideal rationality are based on two hypotheses: the expected utility hypothesis of behavior under uncertainty and the Bayesian hypothesis of adjustment to new information by
consistent use of conditional probabilities. Both are normative postulates of rational behavior over
time under conditions of uncertainty. The expected utility hypothesis (also known as the utility
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the real and the ideal. To be sure, knowing how human behavior deviates from an idealized norm contributes valuable insights to our understanding of legal institutions. But the legal analyst must guard against
the problematic assumption that inherently fallible behavior is correctable through legal regulation.
I develop this thesis in Part I of this Article by sketching an external
critique of current research in cognitive illusion and decision theory.
This critique suggests that both social scientists and legal analysts have
failed to integrate theories of judgment and decisionmaking with theories
of how individuals regulate or manage their choices. The relevance of
this comparison is illustrated in Part II. I trace two theories of choice
management that depart from the traditional hypothesis that individuals
prefer more choice to less. Using an analytical framework that focuses
on outputs (the making of choices) rather than on the inputs (the acquisition and processing of information), I examine some commonly observed
self-imposed constraints on free choice. This analysis illustrates that
identical behavior can be characterized either as the product of an erroneous judgment (i.e., a cognitive error) if measured against the theoretical ideal of the rational utility-maximizer, or as a wholly rational
response if the individual is following a pre-established strategy of selfcontrol.
Because of this uncertain relationship between choice and judgment,
I argue that the traditional model of rational choice remains a useful
norm for evaluating consumer behavior in market settings. Indeed, I
conclude that the cognitive illusion literature may be a defective product
if used uncritically to support interventions in market settings.
maximizing hypothesis) is a central assumption of economic theory: an individual makes choicesor orders preferences-so as to maximize his or her net expected utility at any point in time. Implicit in this hypothesis are several key assumptions: (1) an individual always prefers more choice to
less, (2) the individual suffers no temptation to select alternatives that do not maximize his or her
welfare, and (3) preferences are constant over time. See generally J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 5-63 (3d ed. 1980); J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
56-171 (3d ed. 1984) (discussing basic utility-preference analysis and consumption and demand analysis). Bayesian theory holds that a probability is a description of an individual's uncertainty about
the truth or falsity of a proposition about events. The key to the Bayesian theory is that individuals
will predictably revise their opinions about propositions in light of subsequent evidence. Thus, the
Bayesian conception of probabilities provides a convenient optimum against which individuals' inferences about events can be measured in experimental research. See generally Edwards, Lindman &
Savage, Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological Research, 70 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 193
(1963) (exploring Bayesian statistics, which defines probability as a particular measure of the opinions of ideally consistent people, and its implication on psychological research).
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This is not to say that the insights of modem decision theory have
no relevance to legal analysis. In Part III I explore some of the implica-

tions of a more robust theory of individual choice. A theory of choice
management, which recognizes that individuals deliberately regulate

their choices and adopt strategies to accomplish their goals, yields richer
explanations of the function of many legal rules. This choice management perspective offers new insights on the legal enforcement of promises
in addition to illuminating the hidden analytics in many other features of
private law.
I.

COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS AND LEGAL POLICY

Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde make three separate assertions that
collectively illustrate the dangers of directly applying the research on
human judgment and decision-making to legal policy. Their article be-

gins with the statement that imperfect information as a cause of market
failure is "a small part of a large subject." 6 In fact, as the paper implic-

itly recognizes, the subject is far more global than even the authors concede. It embraces at least three distinct fields of current social science
research: (1) the study of search strategies, or how individuals acquire
information,7 (2) the psychophysics of judgment by which preferences
are generated based on that information,8 and (3) the economics of
6. Information Overload, supra note 2, at 277.
7. The information search literature purports to describe how consumers search for and
choose between product attributes. This scholarship is related to and is generally consistent with the
equilibrium search models described in note 3 supra. Consumer search theories do not, however, use
equilibrium techniques to predict market outcomes. Rather, consumer search theories seek to explain and predict the behavior of individual consumers within markets using basic optimization
techniques. These theories are then subject to refutation through use of experimental subjects.
Johnson, Consumer Choice Strategiesfor ComparingNoncomparable Alternatives, 15 J.CONSUMER
RESEARCH 741 (1984) (discussing search strategies for selecting products in different classes); Johnson & Russo, ProductFamiliarityandLearning New Information, 11 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 542
(1984) (discussing the effects of product familiarity on decision strategies); Lussier & Olshavsky,
Task Complexity and Contingent Processingin Brand Choice, 6 J.CONSUMER RESEARCH 154 (1979)
(discussing search strategies within specific product classes).
8. The study of the psychophysics of human judgment has evolved from three parallel literatures: 0) the study of how individuals' subjective probability assessments vary from the Bayesian
paradigm, see generallyEdwards, Dynamic Decision Theory and ProbabilisticInformation Processing,
4 HUM. FACTORS 59 (1962) (discussing the impact of Bayesian information processing on the development of dynamic decision theory); Edwards, Lindman & Savage, supra note 5, at 193 (discussing
Bayesian statistics as a measure of ideally consistent persons); (2) the comparison of statistical prediction with clinical performance, see generally P. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION:

A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE

(1954); and (3) the

investigation of human strategies of reasoning and the use of heuristics or rules of thumb to resolve

complex judgment tasks, see generally H.

SIMON, MODELS OF MAN:

SOCIAL AND RATIONAL

(1957). These three strands have led to an emerging literature in cognitive psychology concerned
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choice by which these judgments are implemented over time. 9
The diversity of this research and its reach into disparate disciplines
of psychology, economics, and applied decision theory illustrate the diffi-

culty a legal analyst encounters when trying to understand a "small part"
of a complex, interrelated question: how do consumers make choices?

Furthermore, the legal analyst who undertakes to read all of this literature soon realizes that it has a Tower of Babel quality. The various disci-

plines often do not speak to each other, and, even when they do, each
constituent part seems self-contained in its assumptions and axioms.10
with theories of human judgment under uncertainty. Rather than simply comparing human performance in making inductive inferences against the ideal of statistical probability, current research
has led to descriptive theories that purport to explain judgmental errors, biases, and heuristics. Perhaps the most interesting development of this new work is the "prospect theory" developed by
Kahneman and Tversky. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). For a further review of these descriptive theories, see DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (Scholz ed. 1983); K. HAMMOND, G. MCCLELLAND & J.
MUMPOWER, HUMAN JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1980); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982); R. NESBETT
& L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCES: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT
(1980); Abelson & Levi, Decision-Makingand Decision Theory in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231 (Lindzey & Aronson 3d ed. 1985).
9. Choice theory is the branch of economics which studies how an individual decisionmaker
chooses between competing alternatives. Traditional choice theory usually assumes that an individual's preferences are consistent over time, and even those traditional models that incorporate changing preferences do not account for strategic manipulation of one's future alternatives. Economists
and other scholars have recently developed a theoretical structure to analyze individuals' attempts to
control or modify their choices. This theory, known by the roughly interchangeable terms of precommitment, self-control, or self-command, describes how individuals limit or manage their future
behavior to ensure that they not compromise their commitment to a present decision. For a representative sampling of the literature, see Schelling, Ethics,Law and the Exercise ofSelf-Command, in
CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCES 83 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Schelling, Ethics]; Schelling, Self-Command in Practice,in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS &
PROC. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Schelling, Self-Command]; Shefrin & Statman, ExplainingInvestor Preferencefor Cash Dividends, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (1984); Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of
Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980); Thaler & Shefrin, An Economic Theory of
Self-Control, 89 J. POL. ECON. 392 (1981); Shefrin & Thaler, Rules and Discretion in a Two-Self
Model of Intertemporaral Choice (1980) (Cornell University Graduate School of Business and Public Administration Working Paper No. 80-07).
10. The intersection of psychology and economics can be particularly confusing for the uninitiated. A standard premise of microeconomic theory is its methodological individualism. The basic
unit of analysis is the individual. The behavior of groups is assumed to be the outcome of decisions
taken by the individuals who compose them. Often overlooked, however, is the fact that while the
individual is the measuring rod, individual behavior is not studied. The rational economic actor in
economic theory is a weighted average of groups of individuals. Groups of individuals behave as if
their members are rational. Thus, the rationality hypothesis must be understood in this context. See
C. VELJANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW-AND-ECONOMICS: A RESEARCH REVIEW 27 (1982). Unlike
psychology, economics is neither concerned with the process of decisionmaking nor with a conscious
calculation of costs and benefits. Cognitive psychology, on the other hand, is a discipline which
specifically examines internal processes, mental limitations, and the way in which the process of

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:329

The sheer volume and unmanageability of the social science research on consumer choice'I generates a second proposition by Grether,
Schwartz, and Wilde: "The literatures... are flawed by the absence of a
tenable... theory relating task complexity to task performance." 1 2 To
translate this observation into my terms, we do not understand the relationship between judgment and choice. How do individuals translate
their inductive inferences about uncertain future events into active decisions? Indeed, a legal theorist is struck by the atheoretical quality of this
scholarship taken as a whole. No general theories have been advanced
linking the separate processes of searching for information, forming judgments and making choices. From the social science perspective, this
merely reflects good habits of scientific research. The scientific method
mandates an initial period in which alternative hypotheses are formulated and tested. General theories do not emerge until much further
along the research agenda. There is nothing objectionable about the slow
evolution of theory following the careful and rigorous testing of hypotheses. However, the relative infancy of this research suggests we must be
cautious about drawing any normative implications for legal policy.
This does not seem a terribly difficult injunction to obey. But consider the authors' third assertion: "Decisionmakers ... must act."' 13 Indeed, as this statement implicitly acknowledges, decisionmakers have a
voracious appetite for any criteria that can be used in making difficult
choices. The legal analyst is not given the luxury of time; he or she must
organize and order choices based on the world as we know it, not as we
would like it or hope it to be. Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde feed this
insatiable appetite for decision rules by offering an agenda for further
research. Attention should shift, they suggest, to the mounting evidence
that consumer judgment is critically flawed by cognitive errors. An examination of the errors and inferential biases that infect human reasoning
may reveal new and as of yet unanalyzed difficulties with current legal
solutions to market failure problems.
individual judgment is shaped by these limitations. The rationality norm for the psychologist is,
therefore, a postulate of individualjudgment against which experimental results can be measured.
11. Professors Abelson and Levi estimate that there are over 250 publications per year on
decision theory. See Abelson & Levi, supra note 8, at 231.
12. Information Overload, supra note 2, at 280.
13. Id.
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This proposition seems unobjectionable. There is mounting social
science evidence that individuals make systematic errors in their cognitive judgments and decisions.14 These errors are often attributable to
heuristic principles, which are useful tools for simplifying complex judgments but can also lead to severe biases. Experimental evidence indicates, for example, that individuals systematically ignore sample size and
base rates in making probability assessments, are too strongly influenced
in their inferences by the ease with which prior instances can be brought
to mind, and make estimates biased toward initial starting points that are
suggested merely by the formulation of the problem.15 It is only appropriate, therefore, that Grether, Schwartz, and Wilde acknowledge that
these errors might cause unanticipated defects either in the functioning
of consumer markets or in the legal mechanisms used to correct those
markets.
These three propositions illustrate the vexing problem of using
emerging social science research as a basis for legal policy. The literature
on judgment and decisionmaking uses the concept of error or judgmental
bias in a very narrow sense. A cognitive error is the variance between a
hyphothesis of rational inference based on statistical probabilities and an
empirical observation that reveals systematic departures from the ideal in
16
individuals' probability assessments, inferences, and decision-making.
14. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 8; Keown, Slovic & Lichenstein, Influence of Information About Side Effects on Perceived Risk of PerscriptionDrugs, 1 HEALTH MARKETING Q. 111
(1983); Thaler, supra note 9; Tversky & Kahneman, The FramingofDecisions and the Rationalityof
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); see also Fischoff, Hindsight Foresight: The Effect of Outcome
Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUM. PERCEP-

TION AND PERFORMANCE, 288 (1975); Kahneman & Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80
PSYCHOLOGY REV. 237 (1973); Kahneman & Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment ofRepresentativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 430 (1972); Phillips & Edwards, Conservatism in a Simple
Probability Inference Task, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY:

HUM. PERCEPTION AND PER-

FORMANCE 346 (1966). For a comprehensive review of the literature see D. KAHNEMAN, P. SLOVIC
& A. TvERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); Edwards &
von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implicationsfor the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225
(1986).
15. For a review of the experimental research that established these and related errors, see
Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124
(1974). The insensitivity to prior probabilities and sample size illustrates the representativeness heuristic, in which the probability that object A belongs to class B is determined by the degree to which
A resembles B. Bias caused by an individual's tendency to assess probabilities based on how readily
he or she recalls prior instances or occurrences is known as the "availability heuristic." Biases
caused by inadequate adjustment away from starting points is known as "anchoring." See id. at
1128-29.
16. Edwards and von Winterfeldt, for example, describe the key elements of every cognitive
illusion as including:
1. A formal rule that specifies how to determine a correct... answer to an intellectual
question;

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:329

Perhaps because this research yields such intriguing insights into human
behavior, it has not been widely recognized that these departures are errors only if individuals implement their preferences as the formal rules of
statistical probability and expected utility predict. To the contrary, there
is significant evidence to support the claim that individuals do not always

make choices in accordance with the traditional axioms of rational
choice. Rather, they may voluntarily regulate or limit their choices in a

variety of different ways. 7 Until plausible theories are devised to link

the evidence of judgmental bias with the equally compelling evidence
that individuals approach decisionmaking strategically, the analyst fram-

ing policy recommendations risks committing the Pigouvian fallacy of
comparing the real with the ideal. 8 As Arthur Left reminded us, you
cannot tell whether someone is doing something well (or poorly) unless
you know what is being done.19
In sum, there is an inherent tension between the innate caution of
social scientists and the needs or demands of policy-makers. To accommodate this tension, the legal analyst must assume responsibility for de-

veloping plausible theories of human behavior that link disparate fields of
social science research. In this endeavor, the legal analyst should not
knowingly accept incomplete hypotheses. Selective legal intervention
can be counter-productive if based on an inadequate evaluation of all the
possible effects on the disparate forces being regulated. It may well be
socially desirable to attempt further or different legal interventions based
on the mounting evidence of cognitive illusions and errors. But before
2. A judgment. . . that answers the question; and
3. A systematic discrepancy between the correct answer and the judged answer.
Edwards & von Winterfeldt, supra note 14, at 227 (footnote omitted).
17. See supra note 9.
18. Ronald Coase was the first scholar to expose the Pigouvian fallacy (also known as the
Nirvana fallacy). See Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1,22-39 (1960). Although
the article is cited for many propositions, Coase's primary purpose was to expose what he saw as a
fundamental error in welfare economics. The traditional prescription for market failure, linked with
the work of Pigou, had been government intervention either through taxes or bounties (hence the
Pigouvian tax). The fallacy of the claim that market failure prima facie justified governmental intervention was the assumption that regulation was a costless and perfect corrective. The comparison
was then made between an imperfect market (the real) and market intervention by a perfect motivated government (the ideal). This produced a biased analysis favoring intervention. Coase argued
that correcting market failure through intervention was efficient only if the cost of correction were
less than the gain from the remedial measure. In other words, Coase argued that the real must be
compared with the real. Intervention was justified, therefore, only after a comparison of the total
costs and benefits of actual and proposed policy choices. See C. VEL.ANOVSKI, supra note 10, at 810.
19. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. Rr-.v. 451,
466 (1974).
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this decision is reached, alternative and perhaps equally plausible explanations for behavioral irregularities should be identified and presented to
the policy-maker. In the following section, therefore, I will examine
emerging theories of choice management and explore their relevance to
the concept of judgmental bias.
II.

STRATEGIES, RULES, AND THE MANAGEMENT
OF CHOICES

Traditional choice theory predicts that, all things being equal, individuals prefer more of what they desire to less, and that at some price
they will substitute one good for another.2" These behavioral axioms are
derived from the assumption that individuals seek to maximize their aggregate expected utility at any point in time.2 1 Recent scholarship on
human judgment and decisionmaking demonstrates that observed behavior varies from the expected utility norm in important and systematic
ways. What is not yet fully understood is how these deviations relate to
the processes by which choices are actually made. For example, assume
that a consumer regards commodity X as at least as good as commodity
Y in every respect, and better than Y in one respect. The dominance
principle predicts that the rational utility-maximizer would always
choose commodity X. Surprisingly, this consumer chooses Y instead.
The choice of a less preferred alternative might be characterized
either as a judgmental error or as the correct response to a pre-commitment strategy. While both characterizations of this behavior are deviations from the traditional axioms of rational choice, they yield different
policy implications. This suggests that experimental data that provides
evidence for various cognitive illusions may also be explained in terms of
individuals' conscious decisions, unaffected by any illusions, to limit or
regulate their choices.
A.

CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: REGRET AND SATISFACTION

The expected utility norm assumes that rational decisionmakers order their preferences so as to maximize their aggregate expected welfare
20. Choice theory is the branch of economics that studies how an individual decisionmaker
chooses between competing alternatives. The word "traditional" denotes the theoretical concepts
that are most widely used, although many variations on the basic framework exist. See generally P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 405-25 (11th ed. 1980); J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 5, at 56-171.
21. A simple example of the utility-maximization analysis is the decision of a consumer who
has a limited income to allocate among two commodities. Consumers will purchase the combination
of those commodities that maximizes the value of their utility function, subject to the constraint of
their limited income. See, eg., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 20, at 416-23.
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or utility. Recent work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky suggests that consumer preferences are more accurately conceived in terms

of marginal rather than aggregate utility.22 Under their "prospect theory," individuals evaluate choices in terms of incremental gains or losses
from a posited starting point, or anchor. Based on a standard assumption of risk aversion, Kahneman and Tversky propose a theory of judg-

ment with three key features: (1)individuals are risk averse in protecting
gains, (2) individuals are risk seekers in avoiding losses,2 3 and (3) losses

loom larger than gains in human judgment when the prospects of either
are equally probable.24 Prospect theory plays a pivotal role in current
research on judgmental errors because it helps explain empirically ob-

served behavior25 that violates the basic axioms of rational choice. 26 According to the axioms of consistency and invariance, the preference order

among options should not depend on the manner in which they are described. In tests with experimental subjects, Kahneman and Tversky explain the consistent failure of these axioms in terms of the dominance of
the anchoring point-or how the question is framed-in individuals' assessments of the gains or losses from any particular choice.2 7
The effects of variations in framing, as well as the effects of risk
aversion on the evaluation of prospective gains and losses, are illustrated
by experimental results reported by Kahneman and Tversky. 28 Respondents were asked to choose between alternative programs to combat an
epidemic that could potentially kill 600 people. In the first version of
their problem, respondents were asked to choose between Program A,
which is sure to save 200 people and Program B, which carries a 1/3
22. See Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, Values andFrames,39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Choices]; Kahneman Tversky, supra note 8; Tversky & Kalneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
23. This second axiom may seem counterintuitive, but it follows from the first premise of risk
aversion. A sure loss is "felt" more heavily and, therefore, is more distressing than a gamble between losing nothing or losing an even greater sum. This is true even if the gamble carries a higher
expected probability of loss.
24. Kahneman and Tversky describe this final assumption as "loss aversion." It expresses the
intuition that a loss of S100 is more unpleasant than a gain of $100 is attractive. This explains the
observed reluctance of individuals to wager on a 50/50 chance, such as a coin flip. See Choices,
supra note 22, at 342.
25. These experimental results are based on laboratory observations only. Thus, the general
implications of the findings remain uncertain.
26. A final axiom of prospect theory, not relevant to this discussion, is based on the demonstrated biases toward very low probability contingencies. Very low probabilities are either
overweighted or neglected altogether, making such contingencies highly unstable in the decisionmaking calculus. This means that individuals may often be risk seeking in pursuing improbable
gains but risk averse in avoiding unlikely losses. See Choices, supra note 22, at 3,4-46.
27. See id. at 342-46.
28. Id. at 343.
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probability that 600 will be saved and a 2/3 probability that everybody
will be killed. Even though the expected values of the two programs
were the same (200 lives saved), a large majority of the respondents were
risk averse. Seventy-two percent preferred the sure gains of Program A
to the gamble of greater gains with Program B.2 9 In the second version,
the same problem was posed with the anchoring point reversed: Program C causes 400 people to die, while Program D carries a 1/3
probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 probability that 600 people
will die. This time a large majority of respondents (78%) chose Program
D. The subjects were risk preferring in the second version because the
certain loss under Program C seemed less acceptable than the 2/3 chance
under Program D that all may die (even though again the expected values are the same). This experiment illustrates the dramatic effect of
framing the choice in terms of losses rather than gains. Merely focusing
the choice on death rather than life caused a dramatic change in preferences from risk aversion to risk taking.
Together with other research on cognitive bias, these dramatic illustrations of the influence of framing have contributed to the growing belief
by many legal analysts that the traditional rational choice model should
be abandoned as a prescriptive norm for legal policy.3 ° However, by
shifting the focus from the judgment process (the inputs) to the choices
actually made (the outputs), prospect theory yields some quite different
implications.
Since prospect theory is essentially a marginal analysis, the anchoring point becomes the key feature in influencing the individual decisionmaker's choices. Implicit in the theory is a key anchoring norm-the
status quo. The tendency of individuals to anchor their decisions in
terms of their endowments at any point in time produces the "endowment effect." 3 In brief, the endowment effect holds that as a logical corollary of prospect theory, consumers will weight out-of-pocket losses
more heavily than foregone gains of equal expected value. All things
being equal, goods that are included in the individual's current endowment will be more highly valued than those that have not yet been acquired. This systematic undervaluation of opportunity costs causes bias
in consumer choice.
29. Id.
30. 1 evaluate this claim in some detail in Section III (A) infra.
31. This term is attributable to Richard Thaler. See Thaler, Illusions and Mirages in Public
Policy, 73 PUB. INTERESrT 60, 64 (1973); Thaler, supra note 9.
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Consider, for instance, a consumer who refuses to sell a bottle of
wine that is valued at $100, but would not purchase such a bottle himself
for half that sum. 32 Under standard economic theory, such behavior is
irrational: individuals should treat opportunity costs as equivalent to
out-of-pocket costs. The endowment effect provides an alternative expla-

nation--other than high transaction costs or wealth effects-for this popular illustration of the inadequacy of standard economic theory to
explain human behavior.33
Suppose that the status quo-an individual's present endowmentsis, in fact, the reference point individuals use to evaluate future choices in

terms of relative gains or losses. Under this assumption, the impending
choice itself then looms as a decisionmaking cost. Taking responsibility
for a choice has secondary consequences. Individuals feel regret if a loss
occurs as a result of their decision and pride if their choice results in
gain. But when the prospects of either gain or loss are equally probable,

individuals weight the anticipated cost of regret more heavily than the
corresponding benefit of pride. This imbalance implies that a person will
choose not to choose whenever the prospective gains and losses are equally
probable. All other things being equal, individuals are thus reluctant to

make choices in which they feel responsible for the outcomes. As a consequence, individuals are often motivated not to choose.3 4
This phenomenon of "regret aversion" has been thoughtfully ap-

plied by H.M. Shefrin and Meir Statman to investor preferences for cash
32. See Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem,
52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669, 678-79 (1979).
33. The offer/asking prices problem or the effect of differences in wealth on rational choice is
one of the acknowledged difficulties with the application of economic theory to human behavior.
Thus, contrary to the implications of the Coase Theorem, a change in legal entitlements will have
direct allocative effects when wealth effects are present. This problem arises in distinguishing between productive and consumptive rights. A consumptive right arises in typical consumer transactions. Assume, for example, that smoke from a neighboring factory pollutes a homeowner's
property. The homeowner's willingness to pay to abate the nuisance is governed by the effect of the
smoke on his or her utility and not on the profitability of any enterprise. Thus, in our example, the
maximum that the homeowner is willing to pay to bribe the factory not to pollute is limited by his or
her wealth (consumption value). But, if the homeowner is given a legal right to be free from pollution the amount he or she will accept to allow the factory to pollute (economic value) has no wealth
limitation. Therefore, consumption value does not equal economic value.
The offer/asking price problem is a central argument made by critical legal theorists against the
economic analysis of law. See, e.g., id. at 695; Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Entitlement
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401-21 (1981). For an insightful effort to take wealth
effects into account in an economic analysis of legal rules, see Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71
VA. L. REV. 65, 74-79 (1985).
34. See Thaler, supra note 9, at 51-54.
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dividends.3 5 Investors express strong, often vehement, preference for
cash dividends over retained earnings in spite of the resulting increase in
their tax liability. 36 This preference is inconsistent with the norm of utility maximization. Shefrin and Statman explain the preference for dividends as a desire to avoid the responsibility (and potential regret) of
cashing out stock because the stock price may subsequently increase.37
The implications of this form of choice management for judgmental
error analysis can be illustrated with an example. Suppose individuals
are asked to assess their preferences for the following choices:
(1) You win $600, and can either save the money or use it to buy a
stereo that you have wanted for some time;
(2) You can purchase the stereo that you have wanted for some time,
but to do so you must sell 100 shares of stock that you have been
given in order to obtain the necessary $600 purchase price.
Assume a significant majority of the respondents would choose to
purchase the stereo in option 1, but only a handful would be willing to
purchase the stereo under option 2. What might explain this deviation
from what traditional economic theory regards as wholly equivalent
choices?
One possible explanation for the discrepancy could be the biasing
effect of framing. The options are constructed in such a way as to suggest a different anchor for each choice. If individuals use a marginal
analysis of gains and losses starting from initial anchoring points, then
many respondents might choose to purchase the stereo in option 1 because the $600 is perceived as the cost of obtaining a desired gain-the
stereo. On the other hand, in option 2 the question anchors the purchase
of the stereo to the loss of a valued endowment-the stock. If such simple framing techniques can manipulate consumer decisions, then this
would justify an enhanced presumption of market failure due to such
deliberately induced cognitive errors.
However, there is another possible explanation for the hypothetical
experimental result. The responding consumers simply might have been
35. Shefrin & Statman, supra note 9, at 268-71.
36. Shefrin and Statman offer the example of the president of General Public Utilities (GPU),
who proposed to offer shareholders stock dividends in lieu of equivalent cash payments. The proposal would have resulted in direct tax savings of $20 million annually to GPU and $4 million annually
to the shareholders. The shareholder's reaction was vituperative and the company's stock dropped
sharply. Id. at 254.
37. Id. at 268-71.
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following a self-imposed rule of behavior. Such a rule need not be an
externally created obligation but may be merely a norm or standard procedure. For instance, many consumers adopt a simple rule to govern
their consumption decisions: allow spending from income but prohibit
consumption of capital. Adhering to this rule removes from the individual the responsibility for any particular choice and thus reduces regret
and decisionmaking cost. This standard procedure will be adhered to so
long as regret looms larger than pride in the individual's value function.
This explanation of the "behavioral irregularity" in our hypothetical
has markedly different normative implications than those suggested by
the framing explanation. An internal rule is a perfectly rational strategy
for managing complex choices. Indeed, it is possible that such rules are
more prevalent than framing effects in individuals' decisionmaking. Such
a possibility yields the counter-conclusion that it is more difficult to exploit consumers in market settings than the simple human error explanation suggests. After all, if consumers are capable of organizing complex
choices by establishing internal rules of behavior, they are not as easily
manipulated as might otherwise be assumed. Furthermore, the use of
norms and standard procedures in choice management provides additional evidence of the benefits of standardization in market settings. 8
Intervention to alter contract terms or to require individually tailored
contracts compels individuals to assume greater responsibility over particular choices. This increases regret costs and, all other things being
equal, reduces consumer satisfaction.
B.

SELF-COMMAND AND PRE-COMMITMENT STRATEGIES

The puzzle of how (or whether) individuals make consistent choices
over time has vexed economists and other social scientists. In a pioneering paper, R.H. Strotz demonstrated that, given plausible assumptions
38. See Imperfect Information,supra note 3, at 1414. For a discussion of the benefits of standardized contract terms (both express and implied), see Goetz & Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice" An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L.
REv. 261 (1985).

Several benefits derive from standardization: (1) standardization provides a uniform and therefore more intelligible method of comparing alternatives. A party who invests resources to understand the attributes of any particular choice can apply that knowledge to understand subsequent
choices cast in the same form; (2) standardization also contributes to the evolutionary enrichment o
available opportunities by identifying, selecting, and announcing specific attributes that can be generalized to particular classes of transactions. Id. at 286-88. Standardization is not, however, without
its disadvantages. Of particular concern is the state's recognition of standardized contractual formulations (either through legislative codification or judicial interpretation of disputed contract terms).
Such official standardization further restrains already weakened market forces, thereby impeding
experimentation with innovative and potentially more creative contract terms. Id. at 289-93.
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about the way future preferences are discounted, individuals whose preference ordering is constant nonetheless may make inconsistent choices
over time. 39 For example, an individual will choose smaller, earlier rewards despite an initial preference for larger, later ones." George Ainslie later replicated this finding in behavioral experiments with pigeons.4"
The paradox of rational decisionmakers acting on inconsistent prefer-

ences has been widely discussed in both the legal and social science literature. 2 If preferences are endogenous, they are necessarily affected by the
choices one makes. This problem of endogenous preferences or changing

tastes reinforces concern over judgment errors, in particular because of
the "ordering effect." If earlier choices necessarily affect later ones, then

it follows that people's choices can be manipulated by skillfully framing
the order in which they are presented.43
The limitations of the standard axioms of economic theory are im-

portant subjects for further study and analysis. In the case of inconsistent preferences, however, there is an extensive and provocative literature

on self-command and pre-commitment strategies that moderates some of
the troubling implications of choice manipulation.'
39.

Thomas Schelling

Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD.

165 (1956). Strotz' paper deals with inconsistent preferences, which may give rise to self-control
behavior.
40. Id. at 173-75.
41. Ainslie, BehaviouralEconomics I: Motivated, Involuntary Behavior, 23 Soc. SCI. INFORMATION 47 (1984); Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse
Control, 82 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 463, 476 (1975). Like Strotz, Ainslie's research focuses on inconsistent preferences caused by discounting, but Ainslie's work then investigates the behavioral
mechanics of self-control.
42. In addition to the work of Strotz and Ainslie, see also Hammond, Changing Tastes and
CoherentDynamic Choice, 43 Rv. ECON. STUD. 159 (1976); Pellok, Consistent Planning,35 REV.
EcON. STUD. 201 (1968). Traditional choice theorists have not ignored the phenomenon of inconsistent time preferences. See, e.g., Stigler & Becker, De GustibusNon Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 76 (1977). The legal literature on the endogenecity of choices has focused on the phenomenon
not as a puzzle to be solved but as evidence that economic analysis is indeterminate and thus an
inappropriate basis for legal policy. See, e.g., Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769.
43. See generally Levine & Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561
(1977).
44. The theory of self-command or pre-commitment describes how the individual limits or
modifies future behavior in order to ensure that a commitment to a present decision is not subsequently compromised. In essence, pre-commitment theory explores the motivations and devices by
which a decisionmaker reinforces a choice made today by taking steps to prevent a contrary decision
being made tomorrow. In addition to the work of economists, see supra note 10, psychologists have
done considerable research on the techniques people deliberately use to modify their own behavior.
See, eg., BEHAVIOR CHANGE THROUGH SELF-CONTROL (M. Goldfried & M. Merbaum eds. 1973);
K.D. O'LEARY & G.O. WILSON, BEHAVIOR THERAPY 470-73 (1975). For an interesting experimental study of individuals using explicit formalized contracts to modify their future behavior, see
D. O'BANION & D. WHALEY, BEHAVIOR CONTRACTING (1981).
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has vividly illustrated the variety of methods that individuals use to exer-

cise self-command, such as smoking clinics, Christmas Savings Clubs,
credit counselors, and diet clubs. a5 Recently, Richard Thaler and H.M.
Shefrin have addressed the problem of inconsistent choices using a more
sophisticated analytic framework.4 6 Departing from the intertemporal
model used by Strotz and Ainslie, 7 Thaler and Shefrin suggest a new

paradigm that borrows from agency theory.48 Consider, for example, an
individual who wishes to forego a present indulgence but at the same

time gives in to the temptation. Rather than modeling this as a problem
of intertemporal preferences or changing tastes, Thaler and Shefrin ana-

lyze it as an internal conflict of interest. They borrow the principal-agent
paradigm in order to analyze how individual decisionmakers resolve
clashes between conflicting internal desires.
Thaler and Shefrin model the individual as a collection of many
decisionmakers, where responsibility for making choices rotates among
the members of the group. The model consists of one "planner" (or principal) and a series of "doers" (or agents). Each doer exercises direct control over the individual's decisions for one time period only. The

planner, on the other hand, exercises indirect control throughout the individual's lifetime by influencing each doer's decisions. The planner derives utility from each doer's utility, but because the planner has a longer
time horizon, a conflict of interests inevitably develops.4 9 The planner
45. Schelling, Egonomics, or the Act of Self-Management, 68 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS &
PROC. 290 (1978); Schelling, Ethics, supra note 9; Schelling, Self-Command, supra note 9.
46. Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 9.
47. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
48. Agency theory addresses the problem of monitoring conflicts of interest between individuals who are engaged in a collective endeavor. The theory is the work of Jensen and Meckling's
seminal paper, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior,Agency Costsand Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling's work was anticipated to some extent by Alchian &
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 778
(1962); and, as in all things, by A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIoNS 700 (E. Cannon ed. 1937).
There have been a number of applications of agency cost theory in the legal literature. See, e.g.,
Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairnessand CorporateStructure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738
(1978); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Fischel &
Easterbrook, Corporate Control Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982); Goetz & Scott, Principlesof
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financingand
PrioritiesAmong Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982).
49. The link between the planner's utility and the doer's utility is a key feature of the model
since it creates an alignment of interests for the two "cells" of the individual. Improving the doer's
relative position also enhances the planner's welfare. On the other hand, the alignment is incomplete
because the planner has a longer time horizon than the doer. As a result, the planner monitors the
doer's activity to prevent the doer's shortsightedness from diminishing the individual's total welfare.
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favors an optimal plan of consumption spread over the individual's lifetime. Each doer, however, is myopic and favors present consumption
over long-range objectives. In order to achieve the desired plan of consumption, the planner must moniter each doer to ensure that the doer's
decisions accord with the individual's long-range objectives.
There are two kinds of pre-commitment techniques or strategies
that the planner can use to control internal conflicts over preferences.
One strategy is to manipulate the doer's incentives. Thus, the planner
might attempt to increase the costs to the doer of the disfavored consumption behavior or to increase the benefits of adhering to long-range
preferences. For instance, the planner can promise to buy a stereo if he
or she refrains from smoking for six months. Unfortunately, this technique requires the exercise of will by the doer and thus carries a cost in
reducing the individual's overall utility. In essence, it requires consumption behavior that would otherwise be regarded as suboptimal.
As an alternative technique, the planner can manipulate the doer's
range of choices. Throwing away the carton of cigarettes is a direct attempt to reduce the doer's opportunities. Unfortunately, direct strategies
for limiting choices are often impracticable. The planner instead may
elect to adopt a rule to control the doer's detrimental behavior, such as
"do not buy cigarettes" or "never inhale the smoke." Such rules may be
enforced externally (Christmas Clubs are a favorite illustration) or they
may be enforced internally by developing a standard procedure or habit.
The power of internal rules of self-command is buttressed by the previous
discussion of regret. Once the rule becomes the reference or anchoring
point, departures from the rule require an independent choice. But
choice implies responsibility and responsibility, as previously demonstrated, more frequently leads to regret than to satisfaction.5" Thus, the
rule becomes entrenched as a standardized response to the particular
choice.5 1
Working backward from self-command to the judgment process
yields some interesting implications. Shefrin and Statman suggest that
investors' preferences for cash dividends over stock dividends or retained
earnings may be explained by a pre-commitment rule never to consume
In essence, the planner attempts to redirect the doer's myopic decisions. The planner cannot, however, exercise perfect control over the doer's decisions without incurring some costs. These costs
create an internal welfare tradeoff for the planner. The planner can improve control over the doer
only by incurring additional monitoring costs, which reduce overall welfare. See Thaler & Shefrin,
supra note 9, at 393-96.
50. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
51. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 38, at 286-90.
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capital. 2 Such a rule also explains why observed consumer behavior so
often seems to violate the standard arbitrage assumption of economic
theory. Thus, for example, although I pride myself on some sophistication in financial matters, I continue to pay considerably more in credit
card interest charges than I save in the corresponding interest income
earned. Prior to the passage of the Truth in Lending Act, 3 my behavior
might have been described as a cognitive error induced by the practice of
anchoring the value of retail goods to the credit rather than the cash
price. 4 Interestingly, consumer behavior with respect to savings and interest charges has not changed measurably even though federal regulations now require disclosure of interest charges.5"
The intuitively compelling explanation for this "irrational" behavior
is that consumers (myself included) are simply following a rule: never
withdraw from savings. By prohibiting withdrawals from savings, consumers avoid the possibility of not replenishing the fund because of weak
will. In other words, the doer is prevented from gaining access to the
capital. Allowing the use of current savings to finance current costs may
cause consumers' investments to be depleted more quickly than is consistent with their long-term goals.
This brief analysis of pre-commitment techniques merely confirms
the possibility that ex post management of individual choice may have
far-reaching feedback effects on the ex ante process of making judgments.
If the research on choice management has a unifying theme, it is that
individuals use self-generated rules to organize and simplify complex
phenomena. These behavioral rules sometimes lead to judgmental biases
precisely because they are so useful in ameliorating the stresses of decisionmaking. But if we assume that every decisionmaker has a network of
internal rules, the problems of selecting an optimal complement of legal
rules become more vexing. Exogenous rules of law are necessarily generalized since they apply to classes of persons. Conversely, endogenous
rules of behavior emerge from individual experience and thus are highly
52. Shefrin & Statman, supra note 9, at 254-55.
53. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1982).
54. Credit sellers typically described interest charges as the "time price differential," thus
anchoring the price of retail goods to the credit price. This permitted the seller to describe cash
alternatives as a "cash discount." Presumably, the consumer viewed the interest charges as a foregone gain, not an out-of-pocket loss. For a discussion of the pricing confusion that led to the Con-

sumer Credit Protection Act, see J.

MCCALL, CONSUMER

PROTECTION

368-78 (1977); S.

& G. WESTON, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 739-43 (3d
ed. 1974); D. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 332-34 (2d ed. 1975).
55. See Landers & Rohner, A FunctionalAnalysisof Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. REV. 711
(1979).
OPPENHEIM
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particularized. Whatever may be the precise relationship between these

two "jurisdictions," the interactions between private and public rules are
likely to be highly unpredictable and varied.
It may be, of course, that the internal rules and strategies people use

to facilitate their decisionmaking do not have a dominating effect. Until
the relationship between judgment and choice is more fully understood,

however, the legal policy-maker must remain appropriately cautious
about predicting the effects of legal interventions owing to cognitive errors. What those effects are is not the point. The point is that only by

comparing real inputs with real outputs can "deviations" that are appropriate bases for legal policy be identified.
III.

THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHOICE

MANAGEMENT
A.

HUMAN ERROR AS THE BASIS FOR INTERVENTION IN MARKETS

Legal intervention in consumer markets can take a variety of forms.
Information search literature, for example, supports mandatory disclosure of product attributes (including contract terms) to remedy problems
of imperfect information.56 The powerful effects of framing on individual
judgment, as well as the systematic errors people commit in their inferences and probability assessments, raise legitimate concerns that even informed consumers can be exploited in certain contractual settings.57 The
evidence that consumers make systematic errors in their judgments has

led, quite naturally, to calls for stricter regulation of suspect transactions.5 8 By banning the use of particularly worrisome contract terms
56. See Imperfect Information, supra note 3, at 1459-61.
57. The confusion caused by the manipulative framing of credit terms has been extensively
documented. See, e.g., S. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, supra note 54, at 743-44. Framing bias has
led one commentator to call for increased regulation in home mortgage transactions. See Eskridge,
One Hundred Years ofIneptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and
Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083, 1162-83
(1984).
58. See, eg., Eskridge, supra note 57, at 1112-23; Rakof, supra note 4. The literature on unconscionability is one example of efforts to accomodate the incompatible notions of ex ante bargaining and ex post regret. The best modem work in this area is Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand its
Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982); see also Schwartz, Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977); Schwartz, Seller UnequalBargainingPower and the Judicial Process, 49 IND. L.J. 367 (1974).
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such as warranty disclaimers,5 9 remedy limitations, 60 and security interests in consumer goods, 6 ' the state may be able to ameliorate the more

pernicious effects of cognitive error.
Claims for regulation are not so compelling, however, once evidence
of cognitive error is integrated with a theory of choice management. The
risk of systematic manipulation by simple framing illusions seems less
acute if consumers can routinely develop behavioral rules to facilitate
their decisionmaking. In addition, if individuals are equipped with an
array of particularized behavioral rules, legal regulation may have unintended secondary effects. Regulation may, for example, undermine the
internal rule structure that individuals use to manage choices. The
choice management theme thus argues for alternative regulatory devices,
such as the three to five day cooling-off period used for door-to-door
sales,62 rather than absolute restraints on particular terms or types of
transactions. To be sure, providing consumers an unqualified right of
recission during a cooling-off period will necessarily increase product
costs. But such interventions are less intrusive than absolute restraints
on bargaining. By banning a particular contract term or by declaring a
transaction unconscionable, the state completely removes the arrangement from the range of choices available to similarly situated consumers.
If expanded choice is a desired norm, the policy-maker should remove a
transaction type from the market only if there is confidence that consumers will invariably regret the transaction. While a simple human error
analysis might provide such confidence, the lessons of choice management argue against an uncritical reliance on such analysis. Since "irrational" choices may often be as plausibly explained by adherence to
internal rules as by preference manipulation, it is unlikely that policy59. See, eg., Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2308 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
60. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C.

§ 2308 (1982); U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978).
61. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1985); Uniform Consumer Credit
Code §§ 3.301, 5.103, 5.116 (1974); CAL. COM. CODE §§ 9301, 9312 (West 1985); WASH. REV.

CODE ANN. §§ 62(A), 9-501(1) (1974). See generally Schwartz, The Enforceabilityof Security Inter.
ests in Consumer Goods, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 117 (1983).
62. See, e-g., FTC Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (1985);
see also State v. Direct Sellers Ass'n, 108 Ariz. 165, 494 P.2d 361 (1972) (upholding state cooling-off
statute challenged as arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of both due process and equal protection
in singling out door-to-door sellers for special regulatory treatment); Sher, The "Cooling-OfJ" Period
in Door-to-DoorSales, 15 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1968). Thomas Jackson makes a similar argument
for the cooling-off period in the context of bankruptcy discharge. See generally,Jackson, The FreshStart Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1408-18 (1985).
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makers can accurately predict the cases of inevitable regret. Furthermore, there is a Pigouvian fallacy 63 underlying the belief that state regulation can significantly ameliorate the effects of cognitive errors. If
consumers are susceptible to judgmental bias, then regulators are similarly imperiled.' 4

In sum, the integration of judgment or decision theory with choice
theory yields two tentative conclusions concerning the appropriate legal
responses to market failure. First, the ingenuity and common sense that

seems to mark internal behavioral rules provide fresh evidence of the
utility of the traditional assumption of rationality. On the other hand, a
choice management perspective also clouds our ability to predict those
forms of intervention that are most likely to ameliorate the problems
caused by imperfect markets.

This does not mean, however, that decision theory has no clarifying
value for the legal analyst. While this literature does not provide clear
justification for particular regulatory systems, it does provide additional
clues to understanding the nature and function of some basic legal institutions. In the concluding sections, therefore, I examine the value of
choice management as an explanatory tool.
B.

THE LOGIC OF THE LAW

Recent claims that the analytics of the common law could be explained in terms of economic efficiency,6" and the failure of such claims
to withstand critical analysis,6 6 have undercut analyses of the underlying
logic of the law. But one does not have to assert the efficiency of com-

mon law rules to advance several fundamental propositions. Legal rules
63. See supra note 18.
64. Much of decision theory literature is directed towards minimizing the judgmental biases of
social science investigators and other neutral decisionmakers. See Abelson & Levi, supra note 8, at
293-97. Public utility rate regulation offers a further illustration of regulator errors. Regulated utilities hold excess capital since it is relatively costless given the average cost method of pricing used by
regulatory agencies. As with most judgmental heuristics, average cost pricing is a good rule of
thumb. However, it can lead to significant errors in some cases. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 483 (2d ed. 1971).
65. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 404-05, 439-41 (2d ed. 1977); Priest,
The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin,
Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
66. Professor Priest has been the most significant defector from the efficiency of the common
law hypothesis. He has convincingly renounced his earlier orthodoxy. See Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980); Priest & Klien, The Selection of Disputesfor
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). There have, of course, been other critics of the efficiency
hypothesis. See, e.g., Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 307 (1979).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:329

are purposive. But the social purposes they advance are often unstated.
The structure and purpose of rules are often complex and mysterious
primarily because of the masking effects of legal doctrine.67 Legal doctrine serves a social function in maintaining the illusion of consistency as
legal institutions change over time. However, it also serves to obscure
the analytics in any system of legal rules. Thus, in order to evaluate the
effects of particular rules or systems of rules, legal theorists must become
sophisticated in analyzing the behavior of complex factors such as markets, firms, and individuals. The more knowledge legal decisionmakers
have about the behavior of these entities, the better they can evaluate the
fundamental justifications for the legal rules affecting these entities.
In labor law, for instance, a frequently observed phenomenon occurs
when a judicial decision reallocates a statutory entitlement from management to labor.6" Prior to the decision, management may have fought to
retain the right, or labor may have been apathetic about acquiring it.
However, no attempt is made by labor thereafter to sell the right back to
management in subsequent collective bargaining.69 This would appear to
be a paradigmatic opportunity for post-decision bargaining. The rights
are clearly assigned, transaction costs are apparently low, and wealth effects should be negligible.70 Thus, economic theory predicts that postdecision bargaining will reassign the right to the more valued use.
What explains this apparent contradiction of the Coase theorem?
One possibility is that conflicts between the interests of rank and file
workers and those of union negotiators motivate the union managers not
67. The divergence between legal doctrine and the fundamental purposes of legal rules can be
explained either in benign or malignant terms depending on one's view of the social structure that
the law supports. My purpose here is not to enter that debate but merely to assert that such barriers
to understanding the legal system exist.
68. See D. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND POLICY 369-73
(2d ed. 1984).
69. Id. at 371-72.
70. The conditions cited in the text-low transactions costs, informed parties and legal rights
that are well-defined and marketable-are the key assumptions of the Coase Theorem. Under these
conditions, the Coase Theorem predicts that parties will negotiate to reach an efficient outcomei.e., a result which exhausts all possibilities for further mutual gain-regardless of the result the law
directs. A good summary of the theorem can be found in J. HIRSCIILEIFER, supra note 5, at 88-91.
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to "sell" the entitlement even though it is highly valued by the membership.71 Alternatively, this behavior may be symptomatic of high transactions costs or other strategic behavior.7 2 On the other hand, the failure

of subsequent bargains to reassign the entitlement may simply be an illustration of the endowment effect. If individuals subjectively weigh the
prospect of loss more heavily than the prospect of gain, then the endowment effect creates a bias in consumer choice. The interesting question,
then, is whether group behavior is similarly affected by this judgmental
bias. If so, labor may value the entitlement more once it becomes part of
labor's endowment. After the judicial decision, the loss of the legal right

is seen as an out-of-pocket loss, whereas previously the entitlement was
seen as a less heavily weighted foregone opportunity. This divergence
between bidding and asking prices would explain the "no buy/no sell"
paradox, and might also enhance one understanding of how unions
function.
The puzzle of secured credit is perhaps the most vexing issue in
commercial transactions, and one for which a choice management per-

spective also may provide some illumination. An economic justification
for secured credit has continued to elude legal scholars.7 3 Viewed from a
supply side perspective, secured credit is a zero-sum transaction for the
debtor. Any reduction in the debtor's credit bill caused by offering security to one creditor is offset by a corresponding increase in the cost of
unsecured credit. The transfer of property rights in the debtor's assets to
a secured creditor reduces, pro tanto, the pool of assets available to un-

secured creditors upon insolvency.
Several scholars have advanced monitoring cost explanations for
71. Henry Manne suggests that the decisionmaking structure of a union may be such that
union managers are not able to claim any part of the benefits from exchanging the entitlements for
themselves. On the other hand, the union managers may get some modest benefits from the status
quo. Such an extreme agency cost problem would explain the "no buy/no sell" paradox. See Letter
from Professor Henry G. Manne to Robert E. Scott (Oct. 11, 1985) (on file with author).
72. Douglas Leslie suggests several possible theories to explain why no bargaining ensued in
these instances. One obvious explanation is that transaction costs exceed the value of the entitlement. Other explanations center on strategic considerations: either labor may be unable to justify
the trade to its members or the offer to sell the entitlement may reveal too much of the union's
"hand" in collective barganing negotiations. See D. LESLIE, supra note 68, at 371-72.
73. For a discussion of the problem and a review of possible theories for explaning and justifying secured credit, see A. SCHVARTZ & R. ScoTr, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 556-68 (1982). See also Jackson & Kronman, supra note 48; Levmore, supra note 48;
Schwartz, The ContinuingPuzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984); Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankrupt Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981);
White, Efficiency Justificationsfor PersonalPropertySecurity, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984).
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why debtors give security to some creditors and not to others.7 4 These

theories, however, do not explain how security actually aids in monitoring against debtor misbehavior other than in limited cases of asset substitutions.75 A richer explanation may be that security is a form of bonding

against subsequent conflicts of interest. 76 But what makes this form of
bonding more effective than the standard loan covenants used in unsecured credit transactions? Perhaps security has additional benefits as a'
pre-commitment technique. Debtors may offer security to reduce their
subsequent opportunity to "misbehave" when events generate unantici-

pated stresses. By granting a security interest that gives a creditor the
right to foreclose on an asset, the debtor invites quick and decisive sanctions against violations of the terms of the initial credit transaction.
While standard economic theory predicts that debtors would prefer to
retain all their choices, including the choice subsequently to misbehave,

pre-commitment analysis suggests that some security may simply be the
debtors' method of protecting a present decision against future
temptations.7 7
74. See, eg., Jackson & Kronman,supra note 48, at 1152-58; Levmore, supra note 48, at 55-58.
75. See Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, supra note 73, at 1055-59. "Put
simply, the stable, pervasive existence of personal property security is quite unlikely to be a response
to the disequilibrium phenomenon of duplicate monitoring." Id. at 1057. All current explanations
of secured financing implicitly assume that the secured transaction only involves credit. If this were
so, then the price of credit could be determined on a per transaction basis and Professor Schwartz'
skepticism regarding the various efficiency justifications for security would be justified. A better
approach is to conceive of the secured credit transaction as encompassing the exchange of both
credit and services. In the case of the general financing lender, for example, these services are business advice and financial counseling provided to the small firm whose size effectively prevents it from
entering the public financial markets. For these firms, security may be the means of ordering a
relational contract whose terms cannot be fully negotiated at the time of contracting. Thus, the
financial institution invests in the firm in much the same way as any shareholder. Unfortunately,
however, the interests of the parties are not identical and inevitably agency costs generate conflicts of
interest. Specifically, when business failure looms, the debtor has more incentive to engage in risky
ventures than the bank, since the debtor has nothing more to lose.
76. A bonding explanation views security as a mechanism used by debtors to reassure creditors
rather than as a device by which creditors guard against misbehavior by monitoring the debtor's
affairs. By offering assets as a hostage, the debtor reassures the secured creditor that it will take both
parties' interests into account when making business decisions in critical situations. The debtor's use
of secuity as a pre-commitment device also may serve a bonding function for the unsecured creditors. In other words, it offers assurance to all creditors of the debtor's resolve not to misbehave
thereby enhancing the debtor's credibility and credit worthiness. Whether such a theory proves a
richer method of analyzing secured debt is the subject of another paper. See Scott, A Relational
Theory of Secured Financing (forthcoming).
77. I do not mean to overstate the value of pre-commitment analysis in resolving the security
interest puzzle. Such strategies are clearly more illuminating when applied to individual rather than
institutional behavior. Thus, for example, economists generally assume that a firm maximizes a
linear utility function. This assumption is based on the premise that firms seek to maximize profits.
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The preceding discussion is obviously incomplete and anecdotal.
The use of the choice management theme in illuminating these and other
areas of the legal landscape requires much more careful analysis.7 8 My
point has merely been to suggest that this perspective offers the promise
of advancing our understanding of many legal rules. In order to illustrate more clearly the utility of the choice management perspective, in
the concluding section I examine in greater detail the specific example of
promise-making as a self-command strategy.
C.

A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE: PROMISE-MAKING AS
A SELF-COMMAND STRATEGY

Self-command and promise-making share certain common elements.
Individuals use self-control to influence and direct their future decisions.
Similarly, individuals use promise-making to link their intentions with
their future acts; a promise expresses a present intent to perform a future
task. If promise-making has any influence over future alternatives or behavioral incentives, one could even use a promise as a self-command
strategy. This section investigates the relationship between promisemaking and self-control in three contexts: the bilateral exchange, the
donative promise, and the promise supported by a moral obligation or
past consideration. The analysis reveals that a promise's effectiveness as
a self-control strategy depends on the anticipated consequences (legal
and extralegal) of breaching the promise. The analysis also demonstrates
that self-control motivations generally are not significant for promisemaking in a bilateral exchange, but that they are important for "onesided" or nonreciprocal transfers, such as the donative promise or the
promise based on a moral obligation. In fact, self-control plays a large
role in the promisor's motivations to make the initial moral obligation
promise.
1. Promisesin a BilateralExchange
It is helpful to analyze separately two distinct motivations when
studying any type of promissory behavior.7 9 First is the promisor's motivation at the time of making the promise for deciding to perform the
promised future act. Second is the promisor's motivation for making the
But the utility maximizing assumption may not be the correct model for predicting the behavior of
small, closely held firms confronting the prospect of business failure.
78. Thomas Jackson's paper on the fresh-start policy in bankruptcy illustrates how the decision theory literature can enrich understanding of legal rules. See Jackson, supra note 62, at 140818.
79. Posner, GratuitousPromises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 412 (1977).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:329

promise itself. The two motivations are quite distinct and should not be
confused.
To illustrate with a hypothetical, suppose that A enters into a contract to pay B $500 to build new cabinets in A's kitchen. The first question is, what is A's motivation or incentive for deciding to do the
promised future act? That is to say, what is A's motivation for offering
to pay B $500?80 The simple answer is that A wishes to induce B to
participate in an exchange to supply carpentry services. A values B's
services more than the alternative uses of the $500, so A's motivation for
exchanging with B is to capture a share of the welfare gains from trade.
In contrast, A's incentive for giving thepromise is quite different. A
makes a legally enforceable promise to B to reinforce B's confidence that
A will make payment when the job is complete. Without such confidence, B would be reluctant to make preparations for the job (e.g., draw
plans, purchase materials, etc.) or to invest the time in completing the
job. In this sense, A's promise is a bonding device to reassure B of A's
future performance. Of course, the bonding measure's effectiveness depends on the promisee's credibility, which is the major reason why
promises in the bilateral exchange context are legally enforced.8 1 Nonenforcement of such promises would compel promissors to devise alternative bonding schemes.
Absent alternative bonding schemes,
nonenforcement would "bias exchanges toward those that take place instantaneously, as distinct from those that are completed only over a period of time,"" or would bias exchanges toward persons who have
developed a reputation for keeping their promises.83
80. A is likely to have changing motivations or incentives as the exchange proceeds. The concern here is with A's motivation at the time of signing the contract, rather than at the time of
performance.
81. Posner, supra note 79, at 413-14.
82. Id.
83. In essence, legal enforcement of the bilateral exchange promise allows anyone to develop
an instant reputation for trustworthiness, simply by giving a promise. This reputation is limited, of
course, to the extent that legal remedies are perceived to be effective against a particular individual.
As a thought experiment, it is interesting to imagine how commerce would operate in a world
without state-enforced contracts. Besides encouraging more instantaneous exchanges, merchants
would endeavor to cultivate their reputations for trustworthiness and fair dealing, and therefore
would rely more on continuous relationships with repeat transactions. In addition, some firms
would merge in order to police obligations internally. To facilitate noninstantaneous market transactions between strangers, financial intermediaries might develop. These intermediaries would provide the service of holding liquidated damage payments in escrow until the transaction was
completed to the parties' satisfaction. Presumably, the intermediaries' investment in reputation
would be quite high, too. When a serious dispute did develop, the parties and the intermediary
might resort to a preselected arbitration mechanism for guidance on how the intermediary should
distribute the damage payments. In summary, commerce would still go forward in such a world,
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Certain bilateral exchanges, such as diet clinics and Christmas
Clubs, have significant self-control features. Similarly, an author with

fickle working habits might include a deliberately short deadline for completion of a book in the contract with the publisher. But these examples
are exceptional cases. Self-control is not a dominant feature of promisemaking and legal enforcement inthese settings. The relatively low cost

of legal enforcement as compared to substitute forms of bonding (such as
liquidated damages held in escrow) provides the more persuasive explanation of bilateral promissory behavior and legal enforcement.
2. Donative Promises
A donative promise is a promise, not supported by consideration, to

confer a benefit on the promisee. The term does not include promises
that induce a legally recognized reliance84 or that are based on a moral
obligation. 5 Two illustrative cases of the donative promise are Dougherty v. Salt86 and Schnell v. Nell.87 The plaintiff in Dougherty was a
young boy who sought a judgment against his deceased aunt's estate for a
$3,000 promissory note that she had given him. The standard form note
contained the words "value received" and was payable on the aunt's
death or before. Despite the note's authenticity, the court held that it
was a "voluntary and unenforceable promise of an executory gift," 88 basing its conclusion on the lack of consideration. The court reached a similar conclusion in Schnell when it refused to enforce Zacharias Schnell's
albeit with higher transaction costs. Nevertheless, situations exist today that resemble this imaginary world. In the international relations arena, private contracting and state enforcement are either
unavailable or inadequate. Recall the Iranian hostage crisis, where frozen Iranian assets were exchanged more or less instantaneously for American hostages, and the Iranians established an escrow
account with the Algerians to settle American claims against Iran through arbitration.
84. For cases involving reliance where the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applied, see, e.g.,
Devecmon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 A. 464 (1888); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co. 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959); Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898). The Restatement suggests the
following standard for enforcing promises on the basis of reliance:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy
granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 900) (1979). In an economic sense, every promise to
which the promisee attaches a positive probability of performance will result in some reliance, however small or hard to measure. See Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination ofthe Basis
of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1304 (1980). The detrimental reliance required for promissory
estoppel, however, is a subset of such cases.
85. See infra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
86. 227 N.Y. 200, 125 N.E. 94 (1919).
87. 17 Ind. 29 (1861).
88. Dougherty, 227 N.Y. at 202, 125 N.E. at 95.
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promise. Schnell had signed an elaborately drafted and sealed document
that expressed his promise to pay $200 to each of three friends. Despite
several purported considerations recited in the document,89 the court did
not enforce the promise.
As in the exchange context, it is helpful to examine separately the
promisor's motivation for undertaking the promised act and the motivation for giving the promise. In an economic framework, interdependent
or shared utility explains a promisor's incentive to make a gift.9 0 More
important for our purposes, however, is the donor's motivation for making the promise. The donor could, after all, convey the gift immediately,
thereby instantly obtaining any benefits from shared utility and eliminating the promise altogether. 91 Special circumstances such as a temporary
cash shortage might explain why the promisor would wait before giving a
gift, but this does not explain the motivation behind giving the promise
itself. Furthermore, the promisor's motive in the bilateral exchange case
does not explain the donative promise; one who promises to give a gift is
not attempting to induce the promisee to enter into an exchange by creating confidence in the promisor's own performance.
Two motivations underlie the promisor's donative promise: selfcontrol and reliance by the promisee. Melvin Eisenberg recognized both
of these factors in his discussion of why donative promises are made:
For example, a promisor may want to ensure performance by his estate
if he dies without having completed performance; to derive the satisfaction of having made an effective disposition; to protect his present
aspirationsagainst defeat by a less worthy future self or to permit the
promisee to make reliable plans on the basis of the promise. Accordingly, a legal system might plausibly choose to enlarge a donative
promisor's choice-set by providing . . . a promissory form ...
through which a promisor can deliberately bind himself in a legally
92
enforceable manner.
89. In particular, the document recited as consideration: 0) Zacharias' deceased wife's desire
for each of the promisees to receive $200 from her estate, (2) the wife's love and affection for
Zacharias, (3) Zacharias' love and affection for his wife, and (4) the promisee's promise to pay
Zacharias one cent and to release "any real or supposed claims upon him or his estate" arising from
his deceased wife's will. Schnell, 17 Ind. at 29-30.
90. See Posner, supra note 79, at 412. Interdependence of utility functions implies that the
donor's preferences, and hence welfare, are partially dependent on the donee's welfare. Such utility
functions are most plausible in familial or similar settings where the individuals are in frequent and
close contact or where they are likely to be especially concerned with the well-being of another.
91. Id.
92. Eisenberg, DonativePromises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1979)(emphasis added and footnote

omitted).
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The effectiveness of self-control through promise-making depends
upon the consequences that attach to making a promise. In Thaler and
Shefrin's terms, the effectiveness of the promise depends on the rules and
incentives that the planner can establish to influence the doer's decisions. 93 Most people feel a self-imposed obligation to carry out their
promises, especially firm and unambiguous ones. Indeed, many believe
that this obligation is a moral duty.9 4 In terms of the choice management
model, the individual's self-imposed moral or ethical obligation to keep a
promise means that the planner has established a behavioral rule that the
doer must act consistently with the individual's previous representations.
Although internal rules occasionally may be broken, it is safe to say
that most people attempt to observe this norm and break it only in extraordinary circumstances. This rule against lying, like the rule against
consumption from one's capital, has a significant self-control effect and
can be quite useful, especially in the absence of other self-control devices.
The planner invokes the rule by announcing a promise, and thereby improves the chance of obtaining cooperation from the doer. Thus, for example, a simple donative promise can frequently overcome an
individual's own behavioral inertia, as when one would not undertake a
particular action but for the promise to do so.
Legal enforcement of the promise enhances its effectiveness as a selfcommand mechanism. By announcing a legally enforceable promise, the
planners can substantially alter the doer's incentives. The legal remedy
creates a powerful disincentive for the doer to breach the contract. An
enforceable donative promise is thus an effective and low-cost device,
much like the common law seal, that permits individuals to manage or
control their subsequent choices.
Nevertheless, donative promises generally are not legally enforceable. One explanation for nonenforcement is the assumption that the
presence of effective extralegal sanctions for breach are adequate to control subsequent decisionmaking. 95 Donative promises are most likely
made in family or other situations of close personal relations where the
93. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Pound, Promise or Bargain?,33 TuL. L. REv. 455, 455 (1959) ("From antiquity
the moral obligation to keep a promise [has] been a cardinal tenet of ethical philosophers, publicists,
and philosophical jurists.").

95. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 84, at 1304 (discussing the extralegal sanctions for breaking
a promise in a nonexchange context).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:329

promisor bears in part the consequences of any loss the promisee suffers.9 6 Moreover, the promisor who breaches without excuse may suffer
a further loss by alienating the promisee and others, or otherwise damaging his or her general reputation and credibility.
One type of donative promise that courts typically enforce is the
charitable subscription.9 7 At least one court has clearly held that the
donor has the option of making the promise either binding or nonbinding, depending on the language used to express the promise. 98 The ability to choose between enforcement and nonenforcement gives the planner
considerable flexibility in manipulating the doer's conduct, allowing the
planner to invoke a rather coercive change of the doer's incentives if necessary, or permitting a more equivocal position if the future is uncertain
or the planner's resolution is not firm. In Eisenberg's words, the ability
to select between binding and nonbinding promissory forms "enlarge[s] a
donative promisor's choice-set." 99
Self-control obviously is not the only explanation for the promise to
give a gift. The hypothesis of shared utility implies that the promisor
benefits from the reliance value of the promise to the promisee. A promisee will rely to some degree on every promise to which he or she attaches
a positive probability of performance. If the promise iscarried out, then
the reliance inures to the benefit of both the promisee and the
promisor. 1°°
One can view the reliance analysis as either a competing or a complementary explanation to the choice management theme. It is complementary to the extent that the self-control effect of a promise increases
the probability of the promisor's eventual performance and thereby increases the reliance value of the promise to the promisee. Alternatively,
one can interpret it as a competing explanation to the extent that the
promise's reliance value supplants the self-control motivation for giving
96. Every promise to which the promisee attaches a positive probability of performance will
engender some reliance by the promisee. If the promisor breaches, the promisee's reliance causes a
welfare loss. Therefore, interdependence of utility implies that the promisor also suffers some of the
reliance loss. Id.
97. See, e.g., Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); Hirsch v.
Hirsch, 32 Ohio App. 2d 200, 289 N.E.2d 386 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 90(2) (1979) ("A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under Subsection (1)
without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance."). But see Maryland Nat'l Bank v.
United Jewish Appeal, 286 Md. 274, 407 A.2d 1130 (1979) (refusing to enforce a charitable promise
in the absence of detrimental reliance or consideration).
98. Salsbury, 221 N.W.2d at 612-13.
99. Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 8.
100. Goetz & Scott, supra note 84, at 1267-70.
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the promise. Unfortunately, this analysis does not offer a basis for distinguishing between these two arguments. The analysis of moral obligation
promises presented below, however, reinforces the intuitive appeal of the
complementary interpretation.
3.

PromisesBased on a Moral Obligation or Past Consideration

Courts usually do not enforce promises based solely on a moral obligation. Most courts, however, will enforce a promise to compensate
one's rescuer for injury 0 1 or to repay a debt that is either time-barred, 10 2
discharged in bankruptcy, 10 3 or uncollectable because the debtor was a
minor at the time of contracting. 1" The classic rescue case is Webb v.
McGowin.105 The plaintiff in Webb saved McGowin from serious injury
by diverting the falling path of a large block of wood. Unfortunately, the
block fell on the plaintiff and permanently disabled him. Out of gratitude for the plaintiff's heroic effort, one month after the accident, McGowin promised to pay the plaintiff fifteen dollars every two weeks for
the remainder of the plaintiff's life. The court enforced the promise
estate although Webb had given no consideration for
against McGowin's
10 6
promise.
the
An illustrative past consideration case is Edson v. Poppe.10 7 The
court in Edson applied the "material benefit rule"' 8 to a landlord's
promise to compensate his tenant for digging a well on the landlord's
premises. The tenant dug the well at the landlord's request, and the
landlord subsequently promised to reimburse the tenant. Although the
landlord's promise lacked consideration and the tenant could not recover
under a quasi-contract theory, the court enforced the promise.
101. See, eg., Webb v. McGowin, 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935), cert. denied, 232 Ala.
374, 168 So. 199 (1936); Boothe v. Fitzpatrick, 36 Vt. 681 (1864).
102. See, eg., Jones v. Jones, 242 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS

§ 82 (1979).

See, eg., Stanek v. White, 172 Minn. 390, 215 N.W. 784 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 83 (1979). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 limits the practical significance of
this rule because it imposes substantial limitations on debtors' ability to revive discharged debts. 11
U.S.C. § 524(c) (1982); see also Jackson, supra note 62.
104. See, eg., Henry v. Root, 33 N.Y. 526 (1865); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
103.

§ 85 (1979).
105. 27 Ala. App. 82, 168 So. 196 (1935), cert. denied, 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936).
106. 27 Ala. App. at 84-86, 168 So. at 196-99.
107. 24 S.D. 466, 124 N.W. 441 (1910).
108. The material benefit rule holds enforceable a promise made in recognition of a material,
nondonative benefit conferred by the promisee. See I S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 144-147 (3d ed.
1957); see also Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 361 P.2d 177 (1961).
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Moral obligation and past consideration issues lack the element of

interdependent utility found in donative promises. Nor is the promisor
attempting to induce an exchange, as in the reciprocal context. The
promisor's incentive for making the transferin these cases is the response
to a sense of ethical duty or obligation; the promisor essentially acts from

an altruistic motivation. 10 9 Furthermore, neither the reciprocal exchange nor the interdependent utility explanations explain the promisor's
motivation for giving apromise. A pre-commitment or self-control motivation offers a convincing explanation. The promise to make the transfer
is an open expression of current intent that binds the promisor's future
self to the desired behavior.
Of course, the efficacy of self-control depends on the consequences
that attach to the promise. The propensity of courts to enforce certain

moral obligation and past consideration promises is especially significant
in light of the ineffectiveness of extralegal self-control rules and incen-

tives in those contexts. Presumably, most individuals observe an internal
rule that one should remain true to one's word. That rule may not always be followed, however, especially when the temptation to break it is
strong because the contemplated transfer is large. In the moral obligation and past consideration contexts, the promisor and promisee typi-

cally have an arm's-length relationship. This makes the assumption of
interdependent utility implausible. The promisor is therefore unlikely to
feel a loss from the promisee's detrimental reliance on a broken promise.
Moreover, the promisor is unlikely to experience a significant loss if the
109. Posner offers interdependent utility as a complementary explanation to the altruistic motivation in the rescue cases. Posner, supra note 79, at 418. Interdependent utility, however, is an
unpersuasive explanation in these cases. The promisor achieves a gain by satisfying a duty or internally-created obligation to the promisee, but the promisor is unlikely to experience vicariously every
change in the promisee's welfare, as the assumption of interdependent utility would imply. The
promisor and promisee were complete strangers until the accident brought them together. Posner
also argues that a promisor is motivated to make a debt revival promise by the desire to encourage
third parties to extend credit. Id. This reasoning cuts both ways. Renewing a debt increases the
total amount of enforceable claims against the promisor and thereby increases the credit risk. Nevertheless, to the extent that Posner is correct, his argument provides an alternative (competing or
complementary) explanation to the self-control motivation described in the text. In some sense,
charitable subscriptions resemble moral obligations more than donative promises. An altruistic motivation better explains the promisor's incentive to make the transfer than does an assumption of
interdependent utility. Interdependent utilities are most plausible where the individuals have frequent, close contact and long-standing relations. Therefore, to the extent that charitable subscriptions are not motivated by the reliance gain through interdependent utility, and to the extent that
other extralegal sanctions do not exist, legal enforcement significantly aids the self-control effects of
charitable subscription promises. The same may be said of the moral obligation promise. Because
extralegal sanctions are ineffective or nonexistent in this context, the law enforces such promises to
give the planner a self-control device. In contrast, legal enforcement is less necessary in donative
contexts, because of the availability of extralegal sanctions.
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breach alienates the promisee or is noticed by third parties in whose eyes
the promisor wishes to maintain a good reputation. As a result, legal
enforcement is sensible in such circumstances, because it allows the individual to invoke a useful pre-commitment mechanism to fill the void created by the lack of extralegal incentives. To the extent that society values
such transfers and wishes to promote their performance, legal enforcement enables individuals to undertake and successfully complete these
transfers.
The preceding discussion demonstrates that legal institutions can
either facilitate or discourage choice management in the variety of settings where individuals may make promises. Choice management seems
to be a particularly significant motivation for making nonreciprocal
promises. The common law has developed a pattern of legal enforcement
that interacts with the strengths and weaknesses of extralegal factors to
form a rather complete array of promissory self-control devices. Where
the extralegal sanctions and incentives exert a strong influence, the courts
tend not to intervene. Where the extralegal elements are weak, legal enforcement provides an incentive-manipulation device that promisors can
invoke at little cost. To the extent that society wishes to facilitate certain
nonexchange transfers, providing self-control mechanisms is entirely appropriate and will result in a higher percentage of successful transfers.
CONCLUSION
Social scientists are reluctant to advance general theories before
their hypotheses have been tested. Consequently, policy-makers often
must embrace tentative explanations of behavior regardless of the state of
knowledge. The legal analyst, whose responsibility is to organize and
order the social choices facing policy-makers, must decide when and how
the legal system should intervene in markets. The global perspective
which I have advocated confirms the wisdom of restraint. The strategies
or heuristics used by individuals to make judgments about uncertain
events are subject to bias and often deviate from the ideals of inference
and probability assessment. Nonetheless, they are ingrained in individual behavior precisely because they are so useful. Whether the consumer
is satisficing or, as I have suggested, optimizing a more limited range of
opportunities, there is strong evidence that the process of judgment and
choice is directly related to individual experience. Individuals develop
internal rules and strategies to process information, to make appropriate
judgments, and to engineer realistic choices. Changes in the environment
are exogenous shocks that disrupt the internal structure of rules and
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norms that transform inputs to outputs. Thus, intervention to correct a
market failure may have far more powerful secondary effects on consumer satisfaction than has been commonly acknowledged. In short,
while the status quo may sometimes need to be changed, the social engineer must be sensitive to the damage that is likely to be caused to the
mechanics by which individuals regulate their choices. In terms of the
problem of information overload, for instance, while more disclosure
may not be dysfunctional, changes in the methods or forms of disclosure
may well have unintended effects that reduce the benefits of intervention.
Thus, I remain skeptical about the value of the cognitive illusion
literature in guiding attempts at piecemeal optimization in market settings. Nonetheless, I do believe that by exploring the dynamics of human
judgment and choice we can significantly advance our understanding of
some basic legal institutions. Traditional choice theory overlooks many
specific aspects of individual behavior. The social science research on
individual decisionmaking and choice management is beginning to fill
many of the gaps in our understanding. Armed with this new understanding, the legal analyst may be able to construct new and richer explanations of the nature and function of legal rules. I have suggested, for
instance that a choice management analysis helps resolve some of the
more vexing puzzles in labor law and secured financing, and also enriches our understanding of the existing patterns of promissory liability.
In turn, these speculations may stimulate further analysis of the relevance of more complex theories of individual choice to legal policy.

